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Wessels, André: Suid-Afrika se Vlootmagte, 1922–2012 (Bloemfontein, 2017), 290 
pp., isbn 978-1-928424-04-8.
 South Africa’s Naval Forces 1922–2012
On three sides South Africa borders on oceans, and in that sense, the country 
is a large peninsula. It has a coastline of some 2,800 kilometres; approximately 
90 per cent of its imports and exports are handled by its ports, and therefore it 
is a maritime country. Consequently, its navy should form an important com-
ponent of its defence force.
Although the term South African Navy has only been in use since 1 January 
1951, the history of the country’s naval forces goes back at least to 1922. Not 
much has thus far been published on the history of the South African Navy and 
its predecessors. To a large extent this gap is filled by Wessels’ book.
In the first chapter the South African naval history from 1922 until the end 
of the Second World War in 1945 is discussed. The following eight chapters are 
each dedicated to the role played by one of the various kinds of warships in 
the country’s naval forces since 1945, namely: frigates; destroyers; minesweep-
ers and minehunters; patrol ships; hydrographic survey ships; combat support 
ships; submarines; and other vessels, including boom defence ships, tugs, and 
search and rescue craft. In the final (tenth) chapter, general conclusions are 
drawn and guidelines with regard to the ideal navy of the future are provided.
The author conducted many interviews, consulted a large volume of archi-
val sources, as well as many other relevant sources. Throughout the publication 
he evaluates the role of South Africa’s naval forces against the background of 
political developments in South Africa and events in the international arena. 
The role the Navy played during the years of conflict in Southern Africa, espe-
cially in the years 1975 to 1988, is discussed, including the Navy’s indispensable 
support provided to Special Forces (“recces”). The peace-time role of the Navy 
is also discussed, including its diplomatic role (deploying its ships as “grey” 
diplomats on flag-showing cruises), and the humanitarian support missions 
that it has undertaken.
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The book makes a noteworthy contribution towards the (neglected) South 
African maritime (and in particular naval) historiography.
Winfried Heinemann
German Commission of Military History
 Ancient
Dionysopoulos, Christos D.: The Battle of Marathon: An Historical and Topo-
graphical Approach, transl. Nicola Wardle (Athens, 2014), 272 pp., isbn 
978-960-6878-08-04.
Marathon is the first battle of the so-called western canon of battles for which 
a reconstruction might be possible, since the historian Herodotus – our main 
source for the campaign – supplies quite a few details. Despite this, though, as 
well as the fact that modern historians have studied the battle to its minutest 
detail, it is still impossible to reconstruct the battle in a coherent way. Indeed, 
some pessimistic historians have despaired that such a thing might be possible 
in the foreseeable future. One of them recently stated bluntly that: “In my view, 
the battle of Marathon cannot be reconstructed”.1
Christos D. Dionysopoulos obviously does not concur with this view and 
wrote the book under review to present a definitive account of the battle of 
Marathon. He is by training a classical philologist, but his book – as the sub-
title suggests – contains much more than a rehashing of the classical sources 
concerning the battle. Indeed, it uses Dionysopoulos’ broad knowledge of the 
geological, topographic and archaeological factors pertaining to the battlefield 
and hence to his preferred reconstruction of the battle.
The book is divided in eleven uneven chapters. The first seven are being used 
to set up what is the focus of the book; chapter 8: ‘The Battle’. The last three chap-
ters round up the book with the author’s afterthoughts and conclusions. Each 
and every chapter contains extensive discussion of both the sources and sec-
ondary bibliography, with the author choosing what he considers the most like-
ly course of events from among the theories offered by the scholars of the last 
two centuries, although he does not take fully into account the numerous books 
and articles published around the battle’s 2,500th anniversary in the year 2010.
1 Wheeler, Everett L., “Present but Absent: Marathon in the Tradition of Western Military 
Thought”, in Marathon: The Day After: Symposium Proceedings, Delphi 2–4 July 2010, eds. Kos-
tas Buraselis and Elias Koulakiotis (Athens, 2013), 251.
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Chapter 1 is a short overview of the campaign. Chapter 2 is a brief descrip-
tion of the main ancient roads in Attica, including the possible routes of ap-
proach that might have been used by the Athenian army to reach the plain 
of Marathon. Dionysopoulos curiously favours a rough path that runs to the 
north of the main road, through the modern village of Dionysos, and reaches 
the plain at a place called Vrana. Chapter 3 describes the opposite armies and 
discusses analytically the possible composition of the Athenian army. Con-
trary to recent propositions (as expounded among others by Peter Krentz and 
Hans van Wees) Dionysopoulos believes that no light troops accompanied the 
hoplites, and that the latter were composed of rich citizens and recently freed 
slaves—the author does not allow for low-income free citizens (thētes) to have 
accompanied the army, much less to participate in the battle in any capacity. 
Chapter 4 discusses at length the date of the battle and its timing. Dionyso-
poulos believes that the battle took place in the late afternoon of 12 September 
490 BC. Chapter 5 convincingly places the battle in the south-western corner 
of the plain of Marathon. Chapter 6 discusses the positions of the respective 
camps and battle lines. Chapter 7 gives general information and topographic 
details of all the monuments (trophies, tumuli, stelae etc.) that the victorious 
Athenians erected after the battle. Finally, Dionysopoulos uses the informa-
tion garnered from the previous chapters to present his preferred minute-by-
minute description of the battle in the climactic chapter 8. Overall, the book is 
obviously a labour of love and much effort has been put in it by the author. It is 
lavishly illustrated with lots of maps, plates and tables. Despite this, the book 
is neither for the novice nor for the casual reader. In fact, to fully make use of 
it, one needs to be at least broadly familiar with the battle of Marathon and its 
problems. Therefore, this book is definitely reserved for an informed audience 
of academic historians and archaeologists.
Dēmētrios N. Christodoulou
Hellenic Commission of Military History
 Middle Ages
Neuding Skoog, Martin: I rikets tjänst. Krig, stat och samhälle i Sverige 1450–1550 
(Lund, 2018), 584 pp., isbn 978-91-85301-19-5.
 In the Service of the Realm: War, State and Society in Sweden 1450–1550
The early modern Swedish national state was created between the 1520s and 
1550s during the reign of Gustavus I Vasa and after the final collapse of the 
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Scandinavian union between Sweden (including Finland), Denmark and 
Norway in 1521–23. The absolute monarchy, like its contemporaries Francis 
I of France or Henry viii of England, developed rapidly during the reign of 
Gustavus (1523–60). It included the crown’s support for the reformation and 
suppression of the Catholic church. The traditional view among historians has 
been that the main army reforms took place during the 1540s, after the sup-
pression of a large peasant rebellion in 1542–43.
But with this book (which began as his dissertation), the Stockholm histo-
rian Martin Neuding Skoog has tried to trace the deeper development, and the 
interaction between war and state formation. He starts with a study of how 
military organisations on land worked in the Late Middle Ages with a very 
weak central power. He analyses the different kinds of military organisations: 
the armed forces of the nobility, of the Catholic church as well as of the burgers 
in the rather small cities and the forces formed by armed peasants.
He discusses the political effects which the centralisation of military re-
sources during Gustavus I resulted in. He also studies the development, from 
the 1450s onward, of the military resources and organisation of the state, both 
of the King and the non-royal regents. An important part of his study looks 
into the recruitment and use of mercenaries in the Baltic Sea region in general 
and in Sweden in particular.
On the basis of vast source material, Martin Neuding Skoog manages to 
show how a complex situation with different military organisations developed 
into one single army of the early modern state and the monopoly of violence 
of that state.
Lars Ericson Wolke
Swedish Military History Commission
 Early Modern Period
Münkler, Herfried: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg. Europäische Katastrophe, deutsch-
es Trauma 1618–1648 (Berlin, 2018), 974 pp., isbn 978-3-87134-813-6.
 The Thirty Years’ War: European Catastrophe, German Trauma
The war that started in 1618 with a defenestration in Prague, and soon expand-
ed into a European catastrophe, has incited historians to produce a multitude 
of analyses and comparisons. Herfried Münkler takes about 1,000 pages to 
describe the complex web of dynasties in Germany and central Europe 
during the first half of the 17th century. More than one hundred years after 
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the Reformation, Central Europe presented a colourful pattern of diverse de-
nominational entities. But it was not only religion that spawned inter-state 
conflict. Münkler’s forte is his gripping account of dynastic, hegemonic, eco-
nomic, religious and political interests and divergences, and of diplomatic 
efforts and battle achievements alike. What we today perceive as a continu-
ous long war erupted in various places. Münkler, as a political scientist, does 
not succumb to the temptation of simplifying motives, nor does he shy away 
from comparisons with the 20th and 21st centuries. Some of the individual 
conflicts of the Thirty Years’ War are interpreted by the author as forerunners 
of the new, asymmetrical wars of today. It is not just for positivist purposes 
that he traces the campaigns in such detail: what Münkler wants to show is 
how the progress of the war led to new military, political, and dynastic con-
stellations which rendered stringent political planning almost impossible. 
Chance and surprise, as much as strategy and tactics, are the stuff history is 
made of.
The best passages are those in which he explains how images form our per-
ception of history, and for what political purposes it can be instrumentalised. 
Reading this book helps to understand why some call this conflict of incredible 
brutality the true first world war.
Gabriele Bosch
German Commission for Military History
Perlestam, Magnus: Det lilla kriget. Skärmytslingar och kommenderingar under 
stora nordiska kriget åren 1702–1709 (Lund, 2018), 184 pp., isbn 978-91-88661-61-6.
 The Small War: Skirmishes and Commandos during the Great Northern 
War in the Years, 1702–1709
As almost every military historian knows, the great battles in history were rare, 
although much of the focus in research and writing has been on them. Yes, this 
has begun to change, thanks not least to historians like Martin van Creveld 
and John Lynn. Still, there is an imbalance between the studies of battles (and 
sieges) and the daily routines of campaigns.
The Swedish historian Magnus Perlestam has in his latest book studied the 
skirmishes and commandos during the first half of the Great Northern War, 
with emphasis on the Lithuanian and Polish campaigns of the Swedish army 
under Charles xii. Some of this small war fighting took place when Swedish 
patrols or messengers were attacked by bands of armed peasants or regular 
troops from the Polish and Saxon army.
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The threat from smaller or larger units of regulars or irregulars resulted in 
the composition of rather large units sent out looking for provision or forage. 
Sometimes hundreds of soldiers, mostly cavalry, were sent on such missions. 
Any attempt by the local population to hide their cattle or harvest was pun-
ished, and several clashes between armed farmers and Swedish soldiers are 
mentioned in the sources.
When Swedish soldiers were found killed in the woods, the revenge was se-
vere, or as one officer writes in his diary: “When we discovered how our fellow 
soldiers had died, then they [the perpetrators] were well and plentiful retali-
ated as much as they deserved.”
Many of the small war incidents or skirmishes were hardly mentioned in 
the official source material, especially when it comes to revengeful attacks on 
prisoners-of-war or the civilian population. But Magnus Perlestam has spent 
a lot of time trying to find private diaries or letters mentioning these kinds of 
events, and thus been able to reconstruct this very important part of the mili-
tary campaigns of the early modern era.
Lars Ericson Wolke
Swedish Military History Commission
Kronberg, Klas, and Anna Maria Forssberg (eds.): Minnet av Narva. Om troféer, 
propaganda och historiebruk (Lund, 2018), 240 pp., isbn 978-91-88661-57-9.
 The Memory of Narva: On Trophies, Propaganda and the Use of History
The battle of Narva on 20 November 1700 marks the beginning of the Great 
Northern War, as well as Sweden’s most formidable victory during the war, 
which lasted 21 years, when the Russian army was crushed outside the then 
Swedish city of Narva.
In traditional Swedish historiography this victory has been regarded as one 
of the most important in Swedish military history, but although it was impor-
tant, it did not end the war. Peter the Great escaped and managed to rebuild 
and modernise his army, with a similarly important result nine years later at 
the battle of Poltava.
In this book (which is also the yearbook of the Army Museum) the two edi-
tors, who both are with the Army Museum in Stockholm, gathered seven pa-
pers dealing with different aspects of the battle and especially how the battle 
has been viewed and used later in history.
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One paper sees the battle from the ordinary soldiers’ perspective (Oscar 
Sjöström, Swedish Defence University). Another describes how the Russian 
flags and standards (170 of them), as well as guns and kettle-drums were used 
as trophies and how the victory parade in Stockholm was held (Karin Tetteris, 
Army Museum). Other papers discuss the music during the victory parade of 
1701 (Mikael Alm and Maria Schildt, Uppsala university), or how the battle was 
used in contemporary propaganda (Anna Maria Forsberg, Army Museum) and 
later in history (Magnus Rodell, Södertörn University) as well as those left be-
hind at home, the soldiers’ wives (Marie Lennersand, National Archives).
One paper discusses the very concept of victory (Jan Ångström, Swedish De-
fence University). What is a military victory and what is needed for a number 
of tactical victories to result in a strategic victory? The answers to these ques-
tions are, of course rather complicated. A number of victories is not necessar-
ily the sole path towards winning the entire war, especially not if you try to win 
without attrition tactics.
The last paper mentioned here (by Magnus Rodell) deals with the memorial 
lion statue raised at Narva in 1936. It was created in Sweden and is of course 
regarded as a symbol of the victory in 1700, but also as a symbol of the indepen-
dent state of Estonia, and has as such been used as a tool in contemporary poli-
tics. During the great battle of Narva in 1944, the lion was destroyed, but in 2000, 
300 years after the battle, a replica of the first lion was erected again in Narva.
Lars Ericson Wolke
Swedish Military History Commission
 19th Century (1789–1914)
Gupta, Amit Kumar: Nineteenth-Century Colonialism and the Great Indian Re-
volt (New Delhi, 2017), 195 pp., isbn 978-0815376590.
Amit Kumar Gupta is Research Consultant at the Indian Council of Historical 
Research in New Delhi, India. The theme of this thought-provoking study is 
that until the middle of the nineteenth century, there existed in India an en-
tente, “between the forces of capitalist development [Great Britain] and those 
of feudal underdevelopment [indigenous India]” (p. 5). This was characterized 
by one of the most successful imperialistic strategies of the period, mercan-
tilism, in which India was made to export raw materials and foodstuffs and 
import manufactured goods in terms favourable to the British manufactures 
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and investors. The author seeks to show that these unequal economic policies, 
coupled with political and agrarian policies, eventually “wreaked havoc, result-
ing in high land revenue assessment and its harsh mode of collection, rural 
indebtedness, steady immiseration of peasants, widespread land alienation, 
and suicide” (p. i). This caused, according to the author, the “Revolt of 1857”.
Gupta divides his monograph into six chapters to demonstrate the viabil-
ity of each of the components of this thesis. Chapter 1, “For Bourgeoization”, 
highlights the role of the Industrial Revolution and the philosophy of Utili-
tarianism in developing the bourgeoisie, which in turn sought to reform the 
laws and educational system of India. He also describes the role of the British 
“benevolent despots” in improving the Indian infrastructure through the use of 
steam, roadways and railways, and posts and telegraphs. These challenged In-
dian feudalism, and Chapter 2 is “Against Feudalism”. Indian society contained 
aristocrats, landowners, and those who lived tax-free on land and collected 
revenue from the land. The British initiated a series of reforms, including land 
surveys, assessments, and appropriations, that reduced the power of the aris-
tocracy and extant feudal system.
Indian agrarian society needed a system that fairly taxed the land and col-
lected those taxes, and is covered in Chapter 3, “Rent Theory”. The misapplica-
tion of this practice resulted in an impoverished peasantry (Chapter 4, Against 
Peasantry), which in turn served as “a prelude to an upheaval” (p. 112). “The se-
poys’ main grievances”, observes the author in Chapter 5, “For Confrontation”, 
“grew out of the dire financial straits they were subjected to” (p. 118). Moreover, 
in this chapter, other sources of friction are chronicled, including the “greased 
cartridges” that polluted and defiled both Hindus and Muslims, although reli-
gious aspects of sepoy discontent are downplayed. The book’s thesis is summa-
rized in Chapter 6, “Against Qualitative Change”, and a “Postscript”.
“What the mutineers of 1806 sadly missed or lacked at Vellore, their coun-
terparts in Meerut and Delhi [in 1857], however, received in abundance”, claims 
the author, “not only popular support but also the people’s participation on a 
large scale – the sublime magic touch that transformed dramatically a military 
mutiny into an uproarious violent uprising” (p. 125). This assertion, seemingly 
made through a Marxist lens, is not supported by a comprehensive and objec-
tive study of available relevant source material and is not convincing. The term 
“Indian Mutiny” remains the most accurate and prevalent name for this native 
Indian rebellion against its imperial British colonizers, and not the more neutral 
terms “Revolt” and “Rising”. Balanced and thorough research has shown the In-
dian Mutiny was not a pre-planned, cohesive, nation-wide “First War of Indian 
Independence”, since a presumed unity of purpose and pervasiveness did not 
exist during the conflict. Long-simmering grievances and misunderstandings, 
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sparked by the “greased cartridge” issue, basically ignited the Indian Mutiny, 
which gained varying levels of support, but not massive popular backing, gen-
erally in the Gangetic plain area of northern India. More recently, research and 
viewpoints on the Indian Mutiny have matured and become more balanced.
Gupta’s well-crafted, albeit very expensive, volume contributes to the In-
dian Mutiny historiography by providing another perspective of the land and 
economic changes made by the British and the resentment and financial insta-
bility they caused upon Indians and the social class structure. This in turn led 
to the pivotal bloody and brutal conflict in 1857 that shook the British Empire 
to its very foundations and awakened a sense of identity among segments of 
the Indian population.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
Whitburn, Bill: Bright Eyes of Danger: An Account of the Anglo-Sikh Wars, 1845–
1849 (Solihull, 2015), 327 pp., isbn 978-1909982215.
The Sikhs, members of a monotheistic reformist religion, lived in the Punjab 
area of India, between followers of Islam and Hinduism. The Sikhs rose as a 
political power in the void left by the collapse of the Mughal Empire, and de-
veloped a formidable army, which came to be called the Khalsa. This was the 
last significant threat to the British in India.
The First Anglo-Sikh War (the Sutlej Campaign), 1845–1846, and the Second 
Sikh War (the Punjab Campaign), 1848–1849, are frequently overlooked in Brit-
ish military history. They were the culmination of mutual suspicions and ten-
sion between the Sikhs and the expanding British East India Company (eic). 
The Khalsa attempted to bring order to the chaos in their homeland, the Punjab, 
and it was emboldened by the disastrous British performance in Afghanistan 
during the First Afghan War, 1839–1842. The British conquest of Sind in 1843 
basically cut off the Sikh route to the sea via the Indus and encircled the Pun-
jab, thus increasing Sikh concerns about British militarism and imperialism. 
As the Khalsa became more anti-British and bellicose, the British in late 1844 
quietly made unobtrusive preparations to defend against an expected Sikh at-
tack by reinforcing garrisons near the Punjab (Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Ambala, 
and Meerut). The Sikh Khalsa, reportedly concerned about these provocative 
nearby British troop movements, crossed the Sutlej River on 11 December 1845. 
This was considered a violation of the 1809 Treaty of Amritsar, and the eic de-
clared war on the Sikhs two days later, thus beginning the First Sikh War.
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There were four hard-fought battles of the First Sikh War, generally char-
acterized by artillery duels, antiquated British leadership, and the use of cold 
steel by disciplined British and Indian soldiers. These battles were Mudki (18 
December 1845), Ferozeshah (21–22 December 1845), Aliwal (28 January 1846), 
and Sobraon (10 February 1846). The British did not then annex the Punjab, 
and after a short time, squabbles broke out that involved the deaths of Brit-
ish officers. The situation deteriorated into a rebellion, and the British again 
sent troops to quell this unrest, which eventually started the Second Sikh War. 
Battles were bloody and at least one ended in a major stalemate. The British 
and Sikhs fought each other at Ramnuggar (22 November 1848), Chillianwala 
(13 January 1849), and Gujarat (21 February 1849). The British sustained heavy 
casualties fighting in their second conflict with the Sikhs, considered by many 
to have been the most formidable native foe in India. The Khalsa surrendered 
to the British and its soldiers were disarmed. The British annexed the Punjab 
as a result of their victory in the Second Sikh War.
The origins, battles, and leaders of the opposing forces in the Sikh wars are 
described chronologically in this conventional history. In addition to contain-
ing considerable detail, this volume also contains unsupported conjecture and 
an omniscient perspective that would not have been possible for the author 
to possess. Bright Eyes of Danger also contains many illustrations and plates 
(many of which are blurry), and ten generally adequate maps.
This is author Bill Whitburn’s (a retired British Army officer) first book, his 
“retirement project”. While including an eight-page bibliography of published 
books, this monograph contains no footnotes that would permit the reader to 
verify sources and point the direction for additional research. It is disconcert-
ing that the author lists two books that he “relied heavily” on when researching 
this topic, and another two books “[f]or the details and conduct of the actual 
battles” (p. xii). He later apologizes “for embroidering certain facts”. As a re-
sult, the prospective student of the Sikh Wars would do better to read Amarpal 
Singh Sidhu’s interesting and better-researched two volumes on these conflicts.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
 First World War and Inter-war Years (1914–1939)
Preda, Dumitru: Sub semnul Marii Uniri. Campaniile armatei române pentru 
întregirea ţării 1916–1920 (Bucharest, 2018), 380 pp., isbn 978-973-27-2987-8; 
978-973-32-1107-5.
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 Under the Sign of the Great Union: The Campaigns of the Romanian 
Army for the Reunification of the Country, 1916–1920
The year 1918 is a landmark in the history of the Romanians. Based on a rich 
and diverse bibliography, Dumitru Preda’s book is an excellent synthesis dedi-
cated to the campaigns of the Romanian Army in the First World War and later 
on for the defence of the independent state accomplished by the reunification 
of the old provinces.
The author presents the political and economic-military preparations dur-
ing the period of neutrality (1914–1916), which preceded Romania’s entry into 
the Great War (August 1916). Then he highlights the main battles of the 1916 
campaign against the Central Powers coalition, and their characteristics, with 
comments on the organisation and tactics, development of manoeuvres and 
battles. Despite the strong general offensive of the Central Powers and their 
allies (“Die Strafexpedition”), the lack of war experience, and mistakes of com-
mand, Romania – the author stresses – was not knocked out of the war. The 
enemies achieved only the occupation of Bucharest (6 December 1916), and 
the displacement of the Romanian Army north-eastwards into Moldova (the 
Siret-Danube line).
In this context, Preda evaluates the relations with the Entente allies, espe-
cially with Russia, the role of the French mission of General Berthelot, and 
then the place and international importance of forgotten great battles on 
the Romanian front during the summer of 1917. A separate chapter relates 
the 1917–1918 Romanian campaign, in the context of the radical transforma-
tions of the former Russian Empire. All this led to the political and military 
isolation of Romania, obliging its government to accept the Peace Treaty 
of Bucharest (7 May 1918), after the re-unification of Bessarabia (27 March 
1918).
Much space is devoted to the analysis of the 1918–1919 and 1919–1920 cam-
paigns, with new data and appreciations on the re-entry of the Romanian Army 
into the war, on 10 November 1918. Thereby, the author emphasises Romania’s 
relations, particularly in operative terms, with the Entente Powers around the 
opening of the Paris Peace Conference (January 1919). For over a year, under 
complex international conditions, amid the conflicting interests of the Great 
Powers in post-war reconstruction, with part of the national territory still un-
der foreign occupation, Romania was faced with a permanent aggression of 
Bolshevik forces in Budapest, Kiev and Petrograd. The Romanian Army, as the 
author states, acted in legitimate defence following the Hungarian Soviet Re-
public’s attacks (April-May and July-August 1919), occupying Budapest (3–4 
August 1919).
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The objectivity and the equilibrium with which the related issues are dealt 
are noteworthy, including the temporary military occupation of Hungary by 
Romanian troops, as well as the author’s conclusion on the European dimen-
sion of the last campaign, in which the Romanian Army blocked the Bolshe-
viks’ offensive on the continent.
Adrian Pandea
 Romanian Commission of Military History and Director, Editura Mili-
tara, Bucharest
Telo, António José, and Nuno Lemos Pires: A Grande Guerra em África. 
Os que inovam, os que se adaptam e os outros (Lisbon, 2018), 298 pp., isbn 
978-989-8647-88-3.
 The Great War in Africa: Those Who Innovated, Those Who Adapted, 
and the Others
The Portuguese army’s involvement in Africa is one of the understudied cam-
paigns of the First World War. It has been seen as something of a sideshow and 
the books written about the African campaigns tended to do it from a very nar-
row and national perspective. With this book, the authors, Professor António 
Telo and Colonel Dr Lemos Pires, both teachers of History and Military History 
at the Portuguese Military Academy, aimed to provide a wider and global view 
of the Portuguese commitment in the African theatre of operations.
The authors argue that any analysis of the Portuguese commitment in Africa 
during the Great War needs to put in the foreground the very particular politi-
cal situation in the country at the outbreak of the war and during its four years, 
otherwise it is doomed to fail. The political instability due to fratricidal differ-
ent postures among politicians and militaries alike, fed an intermittent civil 
war that undermined any serious attempt to mobilize and deploy to Africa co-
hesive, well trained and well-led army units. With this framework, neither in-
novation nor adaptation were within the range of the Portuguese political and 
military leadership, in clear opposition to the allies, mainly the British, who 
were able to adapt, and the enemy, the Germans, who the authors highlight 
as the only ones able to truly innovate, namely Lettow Vorbeck in East Africa.
The authors’ conclusions provide a synthesis of their major arguments on 
the nature of the Great War in Africa and, in particular, the role of the Portu-
guese political leadership and the operational performance of the Portuguese 
military units that, alone or in coalition with the British and South Africans, 
fought the Germans in Angola and in Mozambique.
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The book provides a historical narrative associated with the authors’ many 
insights, which require careful reading and reflection to fully appreciate them. 
Reading it sparks questions about the role of political meddling on the con-
duct of military operations, and the pernicious impact, which stemmed from 
the choice of military commanders sympathetic to the acting government, 
regardless of their lack of military experience in Africa. To build their argu-
ment Telo and Lemos Pires relied mainly on primary sources from the Por-
tuguese, British, German and South African national archives, an endeavour 
worth mentioning and without which it would have been impossible to have 
a clear image of the allies’ perceptions regarding the Portuguese people. Prob-
lems with discipline, corruption and poor organization together with the lack 
of initiative and resources led the Portuguese military leadership to be unable 
to learn from its own mistakes in time to make a difference, at least on the lives 
of the serving men.
There is one thing that disappoints in the book: in some instances the au-
thors wrote their argument as if they were the only ones with a real and clear 
view of the research on hand. The breadth and volume of the narrative used 
to support their arguments is at times too eager, somewhat affecting coher-
ence and leaving little space for the reader to make their own analysis and 
judgement. The book could also benefit tremendously from the inclusion of 
an index. It should have been a must for such a dense and resourceful book.
The importance of this book goes well beyond a purely Portuguese histo-
riographical interest, because it analyses the role of a small European country, 
yet a big colonial power, due to the size of its colonies. The relationship be-
tween Portugal and the larger colonial powers, while managing a war effort on 
the Western Front and dealing with an intermittent civil war at home is worth 
reading by military and civil officials alike.
Miguel Freire
Portuguese Commission of Military History
Preda, Dumitru, and Costică Prodan: Rumania en la Guerra de Unidad Nacional 
1916–1919 (La Habana and Bucharest, 2016), x + 227 pp., isbn 978-959-06-1682-2; 
978-973-32-1023-8.
 Romania in the War for National Unity, 1916–1919
Romania’s role in the First World War, with few exceptions, such as Glenn E. 
Torrey, has been rather consistently ignored or relegated to a footnote. The au-
thors, two well-known Romanian specialists in the field, remedy that neglect 
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in this book. This is the first Spanish-language monograph, and it provides a 
detailed and insightful operational history of the Romanian campaign and at 
the same time places it within the strategic, diplomatic and political context 
of the war. So, this volume could be considered as an essential overview of the 
subject.
Allied political and military leaders fervently sought the entry of Romania 
into the war. The Entente leaders consistently over-estimated the number of 
German casualties on the Western Front, and were desperately seeking the 
straw that would break the back of the Central Powers. Romania was the key to 
this outlook. It was hoped that the entry of Romania in combination with the 
initial success of Russia’s offensive in the summer of 1916 would have a decisive 
impact on the course of the war. The Romanian figures appeared impressive. 
That, coupled with perceived German weakness and over-extension, would 
hopefully have a decisive impact. Unfortunately for the Romanians, the Al-
lies had vastly over-estimated German vulnerability. They also over-estimated 
what was happening on the Eastern Front. Rather than the initial moves of the 
Russian steamroller, the Brusilov offensive proved to be the last gasp of a Rus-
sia collapsing towards revolution and defeat. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
though a spent force, could still be propped up by the Germans. Contrary to 
allied assumptions, the Bulgarians could and would effectively fight against 
the paltry Russian forces sent to assist the Romanians.
This book recounts and interprets the story of the tragedy and glory of 
the Romanian Army. Its soldiers fought on courageously against overwhelm-
ing odds. Preda and Prodan serve history and the memory of the Romanian 
Army well where they describe the valiant, if ultimately futile, resistance of 
the Romanians in Moldova during the desperate summer of 1917. Of particular 
significance was that the Romanian persistence prevented the Central  Powers 
from moving troops to the Italian and Western Fronts. Deserted by their erst-
while Russian allies and largely forgotten by the West, the Romanians fought 
until their leaders were compelled to come to terms with the Central Powers in 
May 1918. It was only with the defeat of the Germans, produced as the Ameri-
cans turned the numerical tide, that Romania was able to satisfy its national 
 aspirations. The Romanian Army returned to the field just before the general 
armistice, and thus attempted to reclaim its role and rewards as an ally. After 11 
November 1918, the Romanian Army occupied not only Transylvania, Bukovina, 
and the Banat, but moved into territory that would remain  Hungarian. Accord-
ing to the authors, Romania, in destroying the Hungarian Soviet of Béla Kun 
in August 1919, stemmed the tide of Bolshevik expansion into Central Europe.
This synthesis could offer a more accurate story, a valuable reference capa-
ble also to stimulate the interest to develop researches on this subject. Because 
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this struggle started in August 1916 produced a significant, if underestimated, 
impact on the course of the Great War, and for the next two decades, and was 
moreover of huge importance for the future of modern Romania.
Bernard Cook
Loyola University Chicago
Preda, Dumitru, and Nicolae Ciobanu: Bătălia de la Mărăşeşti: 24 iulie/6 august- 
21 august/3 septembrie 1917 (Bucharest, 2017), 272 pp., isbn 978-973-32-1060-3.
 Battle of Mărăşeşti: 24 July/6 August-21 August/3 September 1917
This is a documented history of the greatest battle, by duration, proportions 
and intensity, on the Romanian front during the First World War – the “Roma-
nian Verdun” as it was called at the time. Based on rich and rigorous research 
in various Romanian and foreign archives and libraries of both coalitions (En-
tente and Central Powers), the volume can be considered the outstanding con-
tribution in the field for its comparative and detailed analysis, including new 
evidence and clarifications.
In July 1917, the Romanian front stretched for 560 kilometres, with a great 
concentration of men and means belonging to the Romanian-Russian and the 
Austro-Hungarian and German forces: nine armies (80 infantry and 19 cavalry 
divisions with 974 battalions, 550 squadrons and 923 batteries) combining ap-
proximately 800,000 soldiers on the frontline and 1,000,000 behind the battle 
lines and in reserve. While on the other fronts of Europe, the war of position 
was again the characteristic form of military operations, partially interrupted 
by bloody offensive actions of local dimensions – such as the attack by the 
British in Flanders (22 July) – the situation on the Eastern Front threatened 
to explode and take a very serious turn for the Entente, which could have as a 
direct consequence a perceptible change in the balance of forces between the 
two coalitions, maintained with difficulty until that date. As a result of their 
victories in Galicia and Bucovina, the leadership of the Central Powers felt that 
conditions were favourable for the elimination of Romania from the war.
Structured into an introduction and three chapters, the book presents the 
goals of the changing plans of operations on the Romanian front during the 
summer of 1917; how the operational mechanism of both Central Powers’ 
forces and Russian and Romanian allied forces were prepared, their mood and 
combat capability on the eve of the battle; the geo-climatic environment and 
its possible influence on the development of offensive and defensive actions.
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The Battle of Mărăşeşti is detailed by its three phases: I (24 July/6 August-30 
July/12 August); II (31 July/13 August-6/19 August) and iii (7/20 August-21 Au-
gust/3 September); at the end, the authors review the results of the terrible 
confrontation (55,000 dead, injured and missing allied soldiers, and 65,000 
for the Central Powers) and its echoes in the belligerent camps and neutral 
countries. The powerful Mackensen offensive, started with the main blow in 
the direction of Focsani-Mărăşeşti-Adjud to Iassy, had the German-Austro- 
Hungarian troops “slipping” to the left, as the Romanian divisions entered the 
fight replacing the majority of Russian units. Finally, it was blocking itself, in 
the mountain-forested terrain of the Vrancea Sub-Carpathians.
The Battle of Mărăşeşti, emphasize Preda and Ciobanu, through its results, 
definitively put an end to the generalized German and Austro-Hungarian of-
fensive on the Romanian front, marking, in fact, the conclusion of the 1917 
campaign in this theatre of military actions. In an article published on 12 Octo-
ber 1917 by the British newspaper Daily Chronicle and suggestively entitled “He-
roic Romania”, the famous French writer and diplomat Robert de Flers stated 
categorically: “The reconstructed Romanian Army saved the Eastern Front”, 
summarizing thus the considerable importance of the battle won by the Ro-
manian forces, the only real victory of the Entente in 1917. The volume contains 
a helpful bibliography and a number of useful annexes, with for the first time 
published talks between the high Romanian officers during the battle, as well 
as a significant iconography.
Adrian Pandea
 Romanian Commission of Military History and Director, Editura Mili-
tara, Bucharest
Stewart, William F.: The Embattled General: Sir Richard Turner and the First 
World War (Montreal, 2015), xviii + 374 pp., isbn 9780773546257.
The historiography of Great War Canadian military leadership has until re-
cently been dominated by biographies of General Sir Arthur Currie, the first 
Canadian commander of the Canadian Corps, and the controversial Sir Sam 
Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence during that period. This 
first full-length biography of General Sir Richard Turner, written by researcher 
William F. Stewart, helps overcome Turner’s bleak reputation, re-evaluates his 
military service, and assists in rescuing him from the obscurity to which he had 
seemingly been undeservedly relegated.
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After an introduction, this study consists of eight chapters and a conclu-
sion. The first four chapters focus on Turner’s role in combat, while chapters 
5–8 examine his role as a senior administrator. The first chapter sets the stage 
by highlighting Turner’s military service to 1914, including service as a militia 
officer in the Canadian Mounted Rifles during the South African War (Second 
Boer War). Turner established a sound reputation and distinguished himself 
by his gallantry in action, receiving both the Victoria Cross and the Distin-
guished Service Order. On the eve of the Great War in 1914, Turner had retired 
from the militia after having commanded a cavalry brigade, but on the out-
break of hostilities he was appointed a brigade commander in the first Cana-
dian contingent.
Chapter 2 highlights Turner’s service as a brigade commander, particularly 
at the Battles of Second Ypres and Festubert. At the former battle, Turner “was 
not a success. Poor staff work, inaccurate information transmission, and a dan-
gerous decision indicated he was overstretched” (p. 71). Turner had apparently 
learned from his mistakes, and his performance at Festubert was much better 
and led to his selection to command the 2nd Division. Turner’s performance as 
a division commander up to the failure at the Battle of St. Eloi Craters is exam-
ined, and this defeat, which almost resulted in the end of his career, tarnished 
it irrevocably. Even Turner’s relative success in the little-known Battle of Flers-
Courcelette on 15 September 1916, as chronicled in chapter 4, and despite his 
marshalling Canadian political support, was not enough to save his combat 
command.
In November 1916, Turner was appointed General-Officer-Commanding 
Canadian Forces in the British Isles to address the Canadian “administrative 
and training debacle in England” (p. 148). Chapters 5 and 6 assess his effec-
tiveness and efficiency in that challenging position, with the author opining 
that Turner’s reforms were “broadly effective” (p. 195) and that scholars “almost 
universally acknowledge that the new regime accomplished much in the ref-
ormation of the administration and training” (p. 197). The penultimate chapter 
“explores the sometimes-contentious relationship between Currie and Turner 
through the lens of their correspondence and extends from the selection of 
Currie in June 1917 [as Canadian Corps commander] to their final clashes in 
the post-armistice period” (p. 207). The final chapter focuses on Turner’s role in 
the Canadian Military Council in England; bureaucratic complaints, political 
friction, and controversy; and demobilization woes. Myriad factors conspired 
and caused the Canadian Government to decide “to make no further use of 
Turner in a military role after the war” (p. 257), although he served on the Pen-
sion Board and was active in establishing the Royal Canadian Legion.
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The conclusion sums up and assesses Turner’s reputation and performance. 
Stewart considers Turner to have been an atypical Canadian general of the era: 
“charismatic, courageous, conscientious, capable, engaging, modest, and in the 
trenches” (p. 262). The author does a solid job in enumerating and evaluating 
Turner’s attributes of leadership and character, and aspects of combat com-
mand, although he frequently includes mitigating factors when Turner failed 
to meet expectations. The author also suggests Turner’s reputation may have 
been intentionally slighted to enhance Currie’s standing, but concludes fairly 
that Turner “was not in the first rank of Canadian commanders because of his 
earlier failures and poor reputation with the British, but neither was he in the 
worst” (p. 264).
Stewart’s deeply-researched, incisive, and interesting biography of Turner 
not only presents a reassessment of his military leadership and administra-
tive skills, but also provides a lens through which to view the development of 
tactics, operations, logistical requirements in combat operations, and imperial 
and civil-military relations during the First World War. This convincing revi-
sionist re-evaluation of Turner’s life and military career makes a major contri-
bution to the study of Canada’s participation in the worldwide conflagration 
of the Great War.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
LaMonica, Jeffrey: American Tactical Advancement in World War I (Jefferson, 
NC, 2017), 174 pp., isbn 978-1-4766-6419-4.
The year 2018 marks the centennial of the last year of the First World War, 
known more commonly in Europe as the Great War, and of the year in which 
the American Expeditionary Forces (aef) entered the conflict in large num-
bers and arguably tipped the outcome of the war in favour of the Allies.
When the United States entered the world-wide conflagration in April 1917, 
its Regular Army numbered 127,588 officers and enlisted men. The immediate 
challenge was to expand, train, and deploy to Europe at an unprecedented rate 
a force of significant size and proficiency to support the war-weary French and 
British allies. Conscription was mandated by the 18 May 1917 Selective Service 
Act, which would draft 2.7 million recruits to supplement the enlistments in 
the Regular Army and the National Guard. General John J. Pershing was se-
lected as commander-in-chief of the aef, and he departed for France with a 
small advance party on 28 May 1917.
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The question of how the aef would fight in Europe immediately surfaced. 
Clashes focused first on whether to amalgamate American soldiers into exist-
ing Allied lines or to create an independent U.S. Army, and second on whether 
to send an immediate expeditionary force to France or to withhold U.S. troops 
until they could be organized and trained within the U.S. Tactical doctrine 
should have dictated the length and type of individual soldier and unit multi-
echelon training, but there was significant disagreement over this tactical 
doctrine – which was basically trench warfare as practiced by America’s Allies 
versus “open warfare” as espoused by Pershing.
In this study, Jeffrey LaMonica (Associate Professor of History, Delaware 
County Community College), “examines the extent to which the aef mastered 
the tactical lessons of the Great War” (p. 2), largely by analysing “an array of 
U.S. Army tactical manuals and pamphlets to uncover the extent to which 
combined arms and open warfare techniques became a part of published aef 
doctrine” (p. 3). Chapter 1 identifies combined arms techniques in aef tactical 
doctrine published between spring 1917 and fall 1918, and the second chapter 
highlights “evidence” of Pershing’s open warfare concept in aef tactical doc-
trine. The third chapter establishes “insufficient and rushed training” as the 
primary shortcoming in aef tactical development, while in fact it was only 
one of many deficiencies in aef individual and unit training. The culminat-
ing chapter of this study is a case of the aef’s 5th (not Fifth) Division tactical 
employment and efficiency during the final eleven days of the war during the 
concluding phase of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
The author generally makes good use of official U.S. Army and aef histo-
ries and manuals found in the collection of the Army Heritage and Education 
Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. His additional research, however, 
seems either incomplete or selective, not including such seminal works as Paul 
F. Braim’s 1987 Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse- 
Argonne Campaign (1987), and Parameters articles by James W. Rainey, includ-
ing “The Questionable Training of the aef in World War I” (Winter 1992–93). 
This and other factors give one the impression of a very disjointed and super-
ficial work.
While the tactical evolution of units of the aef is an important topic, a key 
element that should have framed this examination is missing from this analy-
sis. The size and composition of the basic element of the aef force structure, 
the division, should have served as the driver for tactical development and 
employment. This was a very controversial topic at the time. The adoption of 
the unwieldy 28,000-soldier square division, containing two brigades of two 
infantry regiments each, proved to be less than satisfactory. Pershing’s staff be-
lieved this large square division would conserve the limited supply of trained 
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officers, maximize firepower, and sustain itself effectively in combat. In prac-
tice, the square division lacked mobility, and undermined and contradicted 
Pershing’s open warfare ethos. Its deficiencies became apparent during the 
important Meuse-Argonne offensive, when American divisions bogged down 
and suffered excessive casualties. The successes and failures of the infantry di-
vision’s organization set the stage for a debate that would surround it for the 
next twenty years.
LaMonica’s monograph American Tactical Advancement in World War I helps 
remind readers that the 128,000-man U.S. Army executed an unprecedented 
and initially unimaginable mobilization, training, and deployment of a force 
to Europe that numbered almost two million by war’s end. As a result, the U.S. 
Army definitely helped tip the scales to achieve Allied victory in the Great War.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
Hirrel, Leo P.: Supporting the Doughboys: US Army Logistics and Personnel Dur-
ing World War I (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2017), 151 pp., isbn 978-1-940804-32-3.
When the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, the U.S. 
Army totalled some 127,000 Regular Army officers and men, with another 
80,000 National Guardsman, in generally small garrisons stretched over the 
country, particularly in the West and along the Mexican border, and in the Phil-
ippines. The U.S. Army had performed poorly, especially in logistical sustain-
ment areas, during the 1898 Spanish-American War, and was in the process of 
slowly modernizing when the U.S. entered the First World War. General John 
J. Pershing, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces 
(aef), envisioned a 100-division force that would be available to conduct a ma-
jor offensive in France – in early 1919. Almost miraculously, the aef in France 
numbered almost 2,000,000 soldiers (out of an overall U.S. Army numbering 
four million soldiers) by the fall of 1918 and played an arguably decisive role in 
the Allied victory in the war.
This unparalleled feat could not have been accomplished without a verita-
ble revolution in the U.S. Army logistics system. The author, Leo P. Hirrel (who 
served as the command historian of the U.S. Army Quartermaster School), in 
this study views the build-up, deployment, and support of the aef through the 
lens of the modern term of “sustainment”: “the provision of logistics, person-
nel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until 
successful mission completion” (p. xiii).
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This study is divided into an introduction, eight chapters, and an epilogue, 
with reference and informative notes at the end of each chapter. Chapter 1 cov-
ers “The Situation in 1917”, and the second chapter, “Homefront Mobilization”, 
examines the linkage between Congressional, legal, and funding authoriza-
tions and their impact on mobilization planning, military pay issues, training 
camp construction. It also highlights the roles and modernization efforts of 
the Quartermaster General, Ordnance Department, Army Transport Service 
and shipping, and railroads in the massive home front mobilization.
Subsequent chapters cover the macro-logistical situation and the Hercule-
an efforts to establish an overseas support structure and to support the aef via 
the Services of Supply (sos) as it slowly arrived in France and entered the fray. 
Chapter 5, “Evolution of Sustainment Functions in Theater”, covers a myriad of 
topics, including transportation, ordnance, maintenance, fuel, and laundry to 
soldier morale, African-American soldiers in the sos, and graves registration. 
The subject of Chapter 6, “Learning to Work in a European Environment”, con-
tinues to be relevant today, and Chapter 7 is appropriately entitled “Struggling 
Towards Victory”. The latter highlights the planning for and logistical sustain-
ment of aef offensives at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne in the fall of 1918. 
Chapter 8 chronicles and assesses the unexpected, and massive, redeployment 
and demobilization of the aef and the concurrent requirements of contract 
termination, property disposal, and the temporary interment of over 70,000 
fallen soldiers.
General Pershing, in describing the important role of the sos during the 
aef’s final offensive in 1918, proclaimed:
Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the front line 
to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Extraordinary efforts were 
exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands 
made upon it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome 
daily in hastening the movements of replacements, ammunition, and 
supplies to the front, and of the sick and wounded to the rear. It was this 
spirit of determination animating every member of the A.E.F. that made 
it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919 (p. 120).
This well-researched, superbly illustrated, and finely-crafted monograph on 
the logistical sustainment of the aef during the First World War confirms that 
Pershing’s praise was accurate and well deserved.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
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Lousada, Abílio Pires, and Jorge Silva Rocha (eds.): Portugal na 1ª Guer-
ra Mundial.  Uma História Militar Concisa, (Lisbon, 2018), 1162 pp., isbn 
978-989-88593-17-7.
 Portugal during the First World War: A Concise Military History
The centenary of the Great War, or the First World War as it is called in this 
book, has been a great opportunity to revisit this decisive moment in world 
history. New books were published worldwide about a wide variety of perspec-
tives on this conflict. Old approaches were revisited as new ones were recon-
sidered. The Portuguese editorial landscape was not different and seized the 
opportunity of an academic community eager to publish new research out-
comes or to re-edit classical works.
This concise military history of the Portuguese participation in the Great 
War aimed to compile the most recent approaches to this subject. The book is 
the result of 54 authors from different backgrounds: scholars, historians, mili-
tary officers, and independent researchers.
The book is organized in nine main chapters, each one dedicated to a theme 
with varied entries regarding different subjects. The first chapter deals with the 
socio-political context. It begins with a global view based on the major pow-
ers’ perspectives and continues with the very particular case of Portugal where 
political instability and economic infirmity shaped severely all diplomatic and 
military options. The second chapter focuses on the Portuguese military strat-
egy, affecting all the major institutions related to continental Portugal and its 
colonies overseas. This chapter argues top-down, from the highest national de-
fence structure to the technical level dealing with uniforms, equipment and 
personal weaponry.
The next two chapters – the third and fourth – are oriented towards the 
two main theatres of operations: Africa and the Western Front. One deals with 
the defence of sovereignty over African territories and goes into detail about 
the international perspective of the belligerents regarding Africa, the military 
organisation in the Portuguese colonies, the continental army and navy de-
ployments overseas, and the medical service provided for these specific cam-
paigns. The other one deals with the Portuguese Expeditionary Force (pef) 
from a multitude of perspectives. The training before deployment, the prob-
lem of troop transportation to France, and then the issues of the pef once at 
the front. The fifth chapter is dedicated to the decisive moments in 1918, mainly 
related to the Lys battle that took place on 9 April.
The sixth chapter deals with the storytelling and images of the war. The role 
of censorship and propaganda, music and especially fado music in the trench-
es are just some of the subjects within this chapter. The seventh chapter deals 
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with the aftermath of the war. Portugal and the Versailles Treaty, memory and 
identity and even phaleristics, to mention just a few, contribute to a wide range 
of views on forgotten dimensions of the war. The eighth chapter provides a 
short biography of 25 leading figures ranging from the highest political level, 
military commanders in the field, both in Africa and the Western Front, down 
to lower level unit commanders from the navy and the army. The ninth and 
last chapter is about the consequences of the Portuguese participation in the 
war.
Although the contribution of each author does not go beyond ten to twelve 
pages – it is a concise history – some new and thought-provoking approaches can 
be found. And this is what makes the book appealing to different types of read-
ers: not only those who look for rigorous information or teaching material about 
the Portuguese participation in the war, but also for the more demanding read-
ers looking for the richness of insights and bibliography on such a wide spectrum 
of subjects regarding the participation of Portugal in the First World War.
Miguel Freire
Portuguese Commission of Military History
Avram, Valeriu: Războiul aerian deasupra României 1916–1919: confruntarea cu 
aviaţia Puterilor Centrale, Rusiei sovietice şi Ungariei comuniste (Bucharest, 
2017), 380 pp., isbn 978-973-32-1050-4.
 Air War over Romania, 1916–1919: Confronting the Aviation of the 
Central Powers, Soviet Russia and Communist Hungary
This is a valuable contribution penned by the most prolific Romanian histo-
rian of military aviation. The book represents the result of a research effort 
spanning over three decades in Romanian archives, and consulting documen-
tary sources referring to the air forces of the belligerents participating in the 
hostilities in Romania between 1916–1919.
The result of this remarkable effort is an extremely detailed account of the 
Romanian aeronautic organisation (aviation, aerostatics, anti-air artillery), its 
equipment, the concept underpinning its employment in battle, as well as the 
battle actions conducted during the three campaigns – 1916, 1917, 1918–1919. For 
the first time in Romanian historiography, the author presents the air war con-
ducted by the Central Powers, the Red Army and the Hungarian Communist 
Party against Romania during these years, accurately presenting the aviation 
units and their equipment, as well as the main missions executed above the 
front in the national territory.
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The description of air operations, abundant in data, comprises the actions 
of all warring parties, offering a panorama of the war in the skies over Roma-
nia, incorporating little-known and oft-ignored dimensions. This includes in 
particular the 1917 campaign marked by the great battles at Mărăşti, Mărăşeşti 
and Oituz (July-August), which stopped the Central Powers’ offensive towards 
Russia. A special chapter is dedicated to the allied airmen that fought on the 
Romanian front, first Frenchmen (the Berthelot Mission) – important contrib-
utors to the reorganization of Romanian aeronautics in the first part of 1917, 
but also participants in battle together with Romanian pilots – but also Rus-
sians and Britons. Furthermore, the author presents the tasks accomplished in 
November-December 1918 and later, in 1919, against the Hungarian Bolshevik 
offensive, connected with Soviet Russia, a real contribution defending not only 
the country’s independence and unity, but also European peace and security. 
Finally, original illustrations support the high-quality narrative of the book.
Adrian Pandea
 Romanian Commission of Military History and Director, Editura Mili-
tara, Bucharest
Dumitru Preda
 Romanian Commission of Military History, Member of the icmh Bib-
liographic Committee
Heinemann, Patrick O.: Rechtsgeschichte der Reichswehr 1918–1933 (Paderborn, 
2017), 424 pp., isbn 978-3-506-78785-9.
 Legal History of the Reichswehr, 1918–1933
“Your language gives you away.” An example of what language can give 
away – or hide – is the first sentence of the German Defence Law of 23 March 
1921: “The Wehrmacht of the German Republic is the Reichswehr.”
This sentence can be taken to indicate the discrepancy between pretence and 
reality. Patrick O. Heinemann, author of this profound study on the military arm 
of the first German attempt to establish a democracy, prefers to use the phrase 
descriptively: “The Reichswehr was the armed forces of the German Republic.”
Was it, however? Or did it just have the chance to become this after Colonel-
General Hans von Seeckt had been forced to resign in 1926? And what made 
the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic become the Wehrmacht of the “Third 
Reich”? Was this inevitable, and if so, why? The Weimar Republic’s problem 
was not that it was a child of the First World War. Nor was its problem that the 
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military pre-existed the Weimar Constitution’s generally positive concept of 
humanity. Its problem was that the Reichswehr was only willing to support the 
Republic as long as it followed, in Seeckt’s words, “the German way”. And what 
the “German way” was supposed to be was not defined by German republicans 
and democrats.
Patrick Heinemann is not a historian; he is a lawyer, even with a histori-
cal slant. That is the great advantage of the PhD thesis that forms the basis of 
this book. The book is not limited to the normative-descriptive, or normative-
analytical reasoning of legal hermeneutics, even if it is a detailed study of the 
Reichswehr’s place within the Weimar Republic institutional structure.
Even so, the book’s forte is that it speaks both to the historian and the law-
yer. Within the framework of his work, it would have been asking too much for 
him to find his way through the historical research on the Weimar period as 
elegantly as he handles the legal literature. This is not Hans Mommsen’s “The 
rise and fall of Weimar democracy”. Yet, together with Peter Keller’s analysis of 
the German military during the 1918–21 period (“Die Wehrmacht der Deutschen 
Republik ist die Reichswehr”. Die deutsche Armee 1918–1921, Paderborn, 2014), Pat-
rick Heinemann offers the authentically democratic complement to volume 7 
of Ernst-Rudolf Huber’s German Constitutional History. No future analysis of 
the special place of the military within the framework of the Weimar Republic 
institutions can afford to leave this detailed chronological account aside.
It might have been desirable to add to the legal representation a history of 
mentalities, thus revealing the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous” (Ernst 
Bloch). In other words: how monolithic was the Reichswehr’s mental dispo-
sition at a moment when the right-wing nationalists began to supersede the 
“traditional” antidemocratic conservatism. Young Reichswehr officers like Hen-
ning von Tresckow and Claus Graf Stauffenberg had at least sympathized with 
Adolf Hitler prior to 1933. Of particular interest is therefore Heinemann’s ques-
tion to what extent the 20 July 1944 plot has its roots in the Reichswehr; this 
deserves further research.
As a functional elite whose task should have been to stabilize the Weimar 
Republic, the Reichswehr failed. However, others failed as well. They did not 
necessarily have to fail because the term “German Republic” existed only in an 
initiative of a few members of its parliament who in 1926/7 initiated a journal 
bearing this title. After the resignation of Wilhelm Groener as Minister of the 
Interior and of War, the Reichswehr followed President von Hindenburg’s lead 
and did nothing to stabilize the republic. The Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold 
(the militant arm of the democratic centre) created by those parliamentarians 
proved unable to take the army’s place. On 20 July 1932, the Reich government 
unconstitutionally took control of the Prussian state, and again the military, 
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remaining disloyal to the republic, turned out to be both incompetent and 
unwilling.
The Reichswehr did not feel bound to this Reich, because the republican (i.e. 
democratic) politicians proved unwilling to use their power responsibly, and 
rather left control of the military to the officers themselves.
The Weimar Republic still referred to itself as the Deutsches Reich (German 
Empire), which made sense in foreign affairs. At home, after 1920 it began to 
lose its majoritarian support, and its proponents lacked the will to apply their 
power. For lack of substance, the Reichswehr could not develop into the armed 
forces of the German Republic. Thus, the Reichswehr eventually developed 
into the Wehrmacht of the “Third Reich” due to the hubris of those who felt 
they could contain a dictator who had long before 1933 begun to create a mass 
movement.
With meticulous legal arguments, Heinemann explains why this came to 
happen. Between the lines, he points at even more: politicians of the second 
German Republic, the Bonn and later Berlin republic, would seriously neglect 
their sworn duties if they failed to acquaint themselves with the core ques-
tions of military and security politics. Gustav Stresemann’s dictum still ap-
plies today: “Most Germans have only one prayer: Lord, give us today our daily 
illusion.”
How right Stresemann was with this scathing comment is more than clearly 
proven in Heinemann’s study on the Reichswehr as a functional elite. Maybe 
this army might have had a chance to develop into the armed forces of the Ger-
man Republic if the Social Democrats had not preferred, from 1923–8, to desert 
from their responsibility to govern so as to please their basis.
But it takes two to tango. As Heinemann shows convincingly and in great 
detail, the Reichswehr itself remained a “paralegal state within the state” – i.e. 
within a state which, due to its bellicistic character (Rüdiger Bergien) and its 
latent civil war situation never succeeded in generating a republican-minded 
Reichswehr. The bitter irony of the history was that even under the authoritar-
ian system of autumn 1932 the Reichswehr remained a wooden weapon, analo-
gous to President von Hindenburg, the “wooden titan”. Authority was wasted 
in street fighting, the state monopoly on using force in the gutter, and all that 
despite, or even because of the Reichswehr.
Peter A. Popp
German Commission of Military History
Downloaded from Brill.com09/13/2021 12:36:04PM
via free access
 147Bibliographical Records
international journal of military history and historiography 39 (2019) 121-166
<UN>
Kesseli, Pasi: Tykistö taistelee tulellaan: Tykistötaktiikan kehitys Suomessa it-
senäisyytemme aikana (Keuruu, 2017), 360 pp., isbn 978-951-37-7225-3.
 Artillery Fights with Fire: The Development of Artillery Tactics in 
Finland during the Era of Independence.
In 2014, the Finnish National Defence University commissioned a 10-volume 
book series on the history of tactics as employed by different arms of the Finnish 
ground forces. Professor Colonel (ret.) Pasi Kesseli, whose work deals with the 
country’s field artillery from 1918 to the present, authored the first volume in the 
series. The book, based on relevant primary and secondary sources, is a concise 
account meant for a domestic audience. A unique feature is the extensive use 
of unpublished theses that were submitted to the former Finnish War College; 
recently all the unclassified general staff officer course final treatises from 1926 
to 1991 have been digitalised and made available online for research purposes.
Kesseli sets out to examine how Finns planned to use and eventually em-
ployed artillery in battles during the last century, with a special emphasis on 
the years of the Second World War. The author stresses the role of “the father of 
the Finnish artillery” General Vilho Nenonen who, during the formative years, 
developed the organisation and firing methods of the Finnish artillery. Ne-
nonen, for example, came up with a useful fire observer card. However, Finn-
ish tactics were largely designed by the “Finnish Bruchmüller” Torvald Ekman 
(later Lieutenant General). He had started to teach and publish on modern 
uses of artillery as a young officer in the early 1920s. Ekman emphasised that a 
major factor influencing indirect fire in Finnish conditions has been the pre-
dominantly forested terrain.
Until the war years, Finnish artillery-infantry cooperation suffered from the 
lack of manual literature and a limited number of exercises; the Finnish artil-
lery learned their tasks through practice. During the wars, the Finnish artillery 
functioned rather effectively. Even though Finnish firing methods were rather 
sophisticated, in 1943 Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Unto Petäjä, a head of 
one training centre that organised continuing education courses for artillery 
officers, invented a device that freed fire observers from mathematic calcu-
lations. The corrections to firing data from then onwards were calculated at 
the bases of fire. The widely used example of the benefits of this invention is 
the Battle of Tali-Ihantala in the summer of 1944, where a fire observer could 
control all artillery fire units within range, at the time 250 artillery pieces, fire 
simultaneously at one target area and then swiftly shift fire to the next. Largely 
due to the adoption of this method, the Finnish Army was able to bring the Red 
Army’s strategic offensive to a halt. The Finns managed to keep the invention 
secret until the end of the war.
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The lessons learned from the Second World War indicated that Finnish 
tactical principles and firing methods worked well and thus did not require 
 considerable changes. The basic tactical principle of the Finnish artillery has 
been and still is the concentration of fire. All through the decades, the main task 
of the Finnish artillery has remained the same: to support the infantry. How-
ever, the use of heavy fire is today more an operational matter than it used to be.
Kesseli concludes that the Finnish field artillery was developed specifically 
with resources in mind and to suit the Arctic and Subarctic conditions of the 
Finnish territory. The Finnish Army has maintained an exceptionally strong ar-
tillery in today’s Europe. Even though the country is small, Finland still has close 
to 1,600 artillery weapons and heavy mortars in its wartime inventory, more 
than many much bigger Western nations currently have in their stockpiles.
Kesseli’s informative book Tykistö taistelee tulellaan is easy to read even by 
those not too familiar with artillery. The book is likely to remain a standard 
work on the topic and, as such, should be consulted by future historians who 
are fluent in Finnish. It is freely available to download online as a pdf (http://
www.doria.fi/handle/10024/144136).
Pasi Tuunainen
 Finnish Commission of Military History and University of Eastern 
Finland
Laaksonen, Lasse: Viina, hermot ja rangaistukset: Suomen sotilasylijohdon hen-
kilökohtaiset ongelmat 1918–1945 (Juva, 2017), 650 pp., isbn 978-952-291-408-8.
 Booze, Nerves and Punishments: The Personal Problems of Finnish 
Senior Officers, 1918–1945.
The alcohol consumption and mental health of the senior officer corps is a 
taboo topic. In many officer biographies, individuals are placed on a pedestal. 
Thus, these kinds of issues often have been ignored. Lasse Laaksonen, an active 
participant in the domestic and international activities of the Finnish Com-
mission of Military History, fills this gap and analyses how personal problems, 
conflicting personalities and the loss of nerve have impacted on the construc-
tion of the Finnish armed forces during the interwar period, and how those 
factors have affected decision-making and other actions of Finnish generals 
(and some colonels) during the Second World War. He also investigates how 
individual officers coped with their problems and how these problems were 
handled within the Army.
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Laaksonen’s monograph builds upon his earlier works on the relationship 
between the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces Marshal Carl 
Gustav Emil Mannerheim and his generals. This book is also largely about the 
leadership style of the Finnish Marshal and his attitudes towards the afore-
mentioned problems. The book is a kind of biographical study, but also em-
ploys a psycho-historical approach to some extent.
The study in question is based on a wide array of archival sources. Laak-
sonen had access to, for example, military medical and penal records, service 
records and evaluations, personal papers and correspondence, many of which 
have not been utilised before.
A great deal of the book comprises case studies of colourful military lead-
ers. Laaksonen comments on the magnitude of various problems. At the time, 
practically all Finnish senior officers drank sometimes; very few completely 
abstained from alcohol. Since his times in the Russian Tsar’s Chevalier Guard 
the Marshal himself was used to having drinks on a daily basis. During the 
Second World War, he enjoyed a special chilled schnapps made for him and his 
entourage; this mixture of akvavit, vodka, dry white vermouth and gin is still 
sold under the name of Marskin ryyppy.
Marshal Mannerheim’s attitudes towards the problems of his subordinates 
were not consistent. Usually, drunkard generals were given a second chance. 
However, one of the documented curiosities is the ill-fated request by one dis-
charged general, known for his heavy drinking habits and bad political reputa-
tion, to be allowed to go to the front as a volunteer rank-and-file soldier. One 
colonel, who became irresponsible after drinking, had been relieved of his 
command and sent to the home front but, on the insistence of Mannerheim, 
was given a command at the later stages of war – with bad results.
On the other hand, Mannerheim gave some generals more leeway than oth-
ers. He remained quiet about the problems of some of his close and trusted 
associates. Particularly, Mannerheim tended to overlook the drinking prob-
lems of those generals who succeeded in difficult operations or upon whom 
he depended, as the case of the Quartermaster-General, his “true second- 
in-command”, clearly demonstrated. In the end, many of the high-ranking 
Finnish officers who were under the influence of alcohol in critical situa-
tions, had competent subordinates who saved their superiors from catastro-
phes. In one illustrative instance, a general arrived a couple of days late to his 
army corps headquarters because he was sauna bathing and drinking heavily. 
 Mannerheim sometimes decided not to take matters further, as in the cases 
mentioned above and in those of some other of his favourite generals. It was a 
matter of chemistry and rapport. However, the Marshal did not tolerate losing 
one’s nerve because that was seen as a weakness, while stress reactions were 
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 impossible to control. These cases were rare. Facing a Soviet major onslaught 
in the summer of 1944, the Marshal himself came under heavy pressure.
Laaksonen’s book is a pioneering work in Finland. Even if exhausting in de-
tail, and although many cases presented in the book were previously known, it 
is an important addition to the historiography of the Finnish High Command 
and Finnish senior officers in peace and war.
Pasi Tuunainen
 Finnish Commission of Military History and University of Eastern 
Finland
Gruesshaber, Gerhard: The ‘German Spirit’ in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 
1908–1938: A History of Military Knowledge Transfer (Berlin, 2018), 289 pp., isbn 
978-3-11-055289-8.
The recent centennial of the end of the First World War revealed the presence 
of this historical event in the cultural memory of both the adversaries and the 
allies of Imperial Germany as opposed to that in Germany itself. Thus, Gerhard 
Gruesshaber’s English-language PhD thesis about The ‘German Spirit’ in the 
Ottoman/Turkish Army, 1908–1938 would seem to be the right book on the right 
subject at the right moment.
Gruesshaber deals with “military knowledge transfer”. His work focuses on a 
period which can be described as “from pre-war times (1908) to pre-war times 
(1938)” by scrutinizing bilateral relations of two important geostrategic actors 
in international relations from the viewpoint of military elites. The importance 
of military decision-makers in nation building is evident in Germany as well as 
in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, even if there were some decisive differences. 
The creation of modern Turkey cannot be explained without its military, es-
pecially after 1918. In the German case, the military degenerated from “nation 
builder” to “nation destroyer”, as became evident after 1933 when the German 
nation transformed from “rule of law” to a perverted racist Nazi dictatorship.
Gruesshaber’s thesis copes with cultural transfers, in particular of politi-
cal ideas, analysing unpublished and published sources, including a variety of 
memoirs. The cultural transfer did not result in the allies of the First World 
War remaining allies in the Second. To get straight to the point: this did not 
result from the fact that neither Kemal Ataturk as the representative, leader 
and father-figure of modern Turkey on the one hand, nor the German military 
elite, on the other, had any sympathy for democratic modernity as a model for 
either country. In both cases, the notion of modernity was eclectic.
The decisive reason was that Kemal Pasha Ataturk and the military elite of 
the new-born Turkish Republic behaved as calculated political actors when 
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Nazi Germany tried to win Turkey over as a strong believer in Greater Germany 
and its imperial ambitions. The Turkish managed an unbiased analysis of their 
own “raison d’état”, an ability that the German military conspicuously lacked. 
A Turkish-German alliance in the Second World War would have meant the 
end of modern Turkey. “Blueprint Germany”, represented by the German spirit 
of 1933, the roots of which had been laid even before 1914 became quite unat-
tractive due to the constant fragility of Ottoman/Turkish political existence. 
Gruesshaber does not expand on the vivid interest of Anglo-American policy-
makers in Turkey’s benevolent neutrality. Since 1922/23, and contrary to their 
attitude in the First World War), neither Washington nor London were willing 
to question the political existence of Turkey as a player in international poli-
tics. Not only the Russian/Soviet threat, but also this long-standing tradition 
eventually eased Turkey’s nato membership in 1952.
Turkey’s attraction was rooted in its geopolitical position and ability to 
modernize itself, at least until recently. This is supposed to be due to the “Ger-
man spirit” (der deutsche Geist) between 1908 and 1938 competing constantly 
with “blueprint France” and the different patterns of modernization of Anglo-
American origin. In this sense, there had been some interesting alternatives for 
Turkish policy-decision-makers. “Nothing succeeds like success…” How attrac-
tive was Germany as a beaten nation with a pariah status in international poli-
tics up to 1922/24 for Turkey, which largely saw its own defeat as an accident? 
Here, Gruesshaber’s account remains thin, not for lack of trying but due to the 
difficulty of access to as-yet unpublished Turkish sources dating from after 1918.
As a consequence, military cultural transfer is analysed in three main chap-
ters: “The Peak of Knowledge Transfer in the Second Constitutional Period 
(1908–1918)” (pp. 26–102), “German-Ottoman/Turkish Cooperation in the Mo-
bilization of Youth: The Case of Heinrich von Hoff (1916–17) and Carl Diem 
(1933)” (pp. 103–160) and, lastly, “German-Turkish Military Cooperation after 
1918” (pp. 161–239).
The central chapter on Heinrich von Hoff and Carl Diem as intellectual 
leaders forms a kind of “missing link”. Cultural transfer is treated as a kind of 
personalized narrative by analysing autobiographical literature. Unfortunate-
ly, Carl Diem’s extremely ambivalent role in Nazi Germany is lost from view. 
This may seem forgivable as his dazzling biography is not the core subject of 
Gruesshaber’s work.
Apart from the Ottoman Empire’s, and later Turkey’s, high regard for “Blue-
print Germany”, this study highlights the usefulness of German military 
thought emphasizing efficiency and effectiveness for a political system – and 
not only Turkey’s! Retired colonel-general Hans Seeckt’s role as a military advi-
sor to the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek in China after 1926 is another 
example of this.
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This might disturb some post-heroic contemporaries, especially in Germa-
ny, whose notion of development aid lacks the military element altogether. 
But that is irrelevant – Gruesshaber’s study shows the failures of modernizers 
without self-reflection and with a lack of intercultural competence. Adopt-
ing “Blueprint Germany” in Turkey succeeded more or less until 1933. Today, 
the failure of a modernization defined only by western ideology in the “Near 
and Middle East” (further away in geographic terms) is somehow pre-ordained 
as cultural und civilizational synapses are often lacking. “Modernization” – 
 especially in the military – also means social discipline. Gruesshaber’s study is 
worth reading as it raises the reader’s awareness of this. This book is not only 
written history, but highly political.
Peter A. Popp
German Commission of Military History
 Second World War
Barkawi, Tarak: Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II 
(Cambridge, 2017), 321 pp., isbn 9781107169586.
How are soldiers made and armies assembled? Why do soldiers fight and what 
determines how effectively they do so? What does battle do to those who make 
it and what does it do the sources from which histories are constructed? These 
questions lie at the heart of Tarak Barkawi’s ambitious and articulate history 
of the polyglot colonial soldiers who fought for the British empire against the 
Japanese in the Second World War.
The book is organised in three parts. Part I examines the Indian Army’s eth-
nic organisation to rethink the relationship between (imperial) army and (col-
onised) society. While dividing colonial recruits by ethnicity mitigated against 
anti-colonial combination, ethnically exclusive corps struggled to replace ca-
sualties, especially amongst junior officers. How then did the Indian Army – 
with its homogenous units of Gurkhas, Sikhs and Pathans – adapt to wartime 
expansion? Rejecting the opposition inherent in the army/society binary, 
Barkawi argues that the ‘plasticity’ of ethnic organisation provided resources 
which officers and men could adapt and appropriate to suit their purpose. 
British officers grew beards and fasted with ‘their’ men, seeking culturally- 
significant ways to articulate their proximity to – and authority over – colonial 
troops. In similar ways, soldiers framed calls on their employers in language 
that sought to mobilise, rather than to challenge, colonial presumptions. 
Downloaded from Brill.com09/13/2021 12:36:04PM
via free access
 153Bibliographical Records
international journal of military history and historiography 39 (2019) 121-166
<UN>
Neither contemporary writings about Indian ethnicity nor the army shaped 
in their image reflect essential characteristics of Indian society. Nor do they 
represent simply the machinations of imperial strategists. Rather, Barkawi sug-
gests, army and society were co-constituted via the circuits of knowledge and 
power through which colonial soldiers were recruited and organised.
Part II examines discipline, exploring the circumstances in which it failed 
and the processes through which it was reconstructed. Barkawi details the 
shortcomings of the Indian Army in the First Arakan campaign in which 
both British and Indian troops were badly mauled in early encounters with 
the Imperial Japanese Army. The failures of these pre-war regulars – poor fire 
discipline, desertion, self-harm and reluctance to engage – did not reflect the 
inefficiency of colonial troops but the Indian Army’s deficient preparations for 
jungle warfare. How then can we explain the remarkable turnaround in the 
army’s performance from 1943? Barkawi’s answer is as suggestive as it is simple: 
channelling Foucault and Durkheim to read drill as ritual – as something hu-
man and ancient not something western and modern – Barkawi contends that 
drill activates common human capacities for solidarity and organisation and 
is capable of sustaining men with little in common, even in the most brutal 
engagements. Recruits did not bring group identities to training; training gave 
them group identity. Esprit de corps – assembled through vertical and hori-
zontal association, through shared rituals involving the imposition as well as 
the tolerated transgression of discipline – provided soldiers with the resources 
necessary to fight, and to fight on. In these circumstances, Barkawi argues, it 
becomes easier to understand why casualties – often presumed to undermine 
combat motivation – can also bolster the resolve of soldiers to fight. This an-
thropology of combat discipline challenges military sociology’s emphasis on 
group and national identities – neither of which account for the performance 
of colonial soldiers in the Second World War – arguing that the common, ritual 
experiences of training, discipline and contact better explain the behaviour of 
soldiers in combat.
In Barkawi’s account, supposedly distinctive ways of fighting are revealed to 
be situational, products of the contours of battle more than expressions of a 
particular national character or ideology. Instead of seeing combat as a space 
in which political agency is expressed – as per Omer Bartov – Barkawi empha-
sises the limits battle imposes on soldiers. Chapter 6 shows, brilliantly, how 
combat’s forms and patterns limit the choices available to participants. Box de-
fence of a perimeter offered few choices: stand and fight and hope to survive or 
retreat, giving up the perimeter and the meagre, collective protection provided 
by committed, shared defence. Similarly, when surrender was, or was thought 
to be, impossible neither a death wish, nor fanatical loyalty, was required for 
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soldiers to fight to the death. Thus, the brutality of the conflict – both antici-
pated and experienced – encouraged soldiers and officers to give no quarter, 
and to expect none to be given. Here, then, in the constraining and reciprocal 
effects of battle, Barkawi seeks to explain the nature of the war in the Pacific. 
Atrocities, which occurred on both sides, were mutually productive. Whereas 
eye witnesses, and some historians, explained Japanese soldiers’ behaviour on 
the battlefield as evidence of their savagery or fanaticism, Barkawi teases out 
the common, human calculations which shaped soldiers’ behaviour, showing 
that Indian and imperial troops could fight in ‘Japanese ways’, as at the battle 
of Sangshak, in March 1944, when members of 152nd Indian Parachute division 
mounted their own ‘banzai charge’ in a hopeless, and ostensibly futile, counter- 
attack. The Japanese were so impressed that survivors were taken prisoner 
(and many subsequently freed).
If battle could, in some circumstances, scramble racial categories, Part iii 
shows how histories of the war served to reconstruct them. ‘Suffused’ in rac-
ism, Allied accounts of the fighting in Burma sought recourse in narratives 
of Japanese otherness to impose structure on the conflict (and on soldiers’ 
experiences of it). Returning to Sangshak via the battle’s contested histori-
ography, Barkawi shows how racism shaped memories and histories of the 
war, obscuring the common humanity – and mutual intelligibility – of sol-
diers on both sides. Rejecting the normalisation of national armies implicit 
in much of the extant literature, Barkawi invites historians and sociologists of 
war to produce works as cosmopolitan as the armies and conflicts they study. 
Despite the historical and sociological framing of conflict as a national en-
terprise, soldiering has been – and remains – a cosmopolitan, transactional 
business.
From this perspective, some readers may wonder if Soldiers of Empire has 
enough to say about the calculations and agency of the rank and file, even al-
lowing for the obvious archival problems which limit our access to these men. 
After all, training manuals tell us little about how drill was actually conducted 
and less about how it was experienced. Though the archival base for the book 
is dense, South Asianists may find it lopsided. Some military historians and so-
ciologists may feel their disciplines are caricatured for the purpose of critique. 
Questions about masculinity and gender are surprisingly underexplored, de-
spite the sustained and creative engagement with theory (an inflection which 
some readers will doubtless resent).
If these kinds of responses illustrate the perils of working at the interface 
of disciplines and approaches, this book shows just how productive such 
an approach can be. In helping us to see war’s cosmopolitan faces – and to 
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Empire provides a compelling and suggestive account of why, and how, his-
tories of war should be written. Creatively theorised, and deeply engaged 




Muñoz, Antonio J.: The German Secret Field Police in Greece, 1941–1944 (Jeffer-
son, NC, 2018), vii + 248 pp., isbn 978-1-4766-6784-3.
The author rightly points out that, while there is a short and succinct history 
of the German “Secret Field Police” (Geheime Feldpolizei) available, and while 
there are several accounts of the German rule in Greece during the Second 
World War, there is as yet no account of the Secret Field Police’s role in this 
rule. His book is designed to fill the gap, and more.
Muñoz has done his homework – more than that, he has worked in all the 
archives which need to be consulted. He lists an impressive array of secondary 
literature, even if some titles appear both in the English and German version. 
Even so, some of the most pertinent literature has escaped him: the ground-
breaking series “Germany and the Second World War” appears neither in Eng-
lish nor in the German original.
While his focus is on Greece, Muñoz believes the Secret Field Police’s role 
there can only be understood properly if seen in the context of its role else-
where, in particular in the Soviet Union, and in the context of organizations 
of the same name in earlier German armies. Here is where the book has its 
weaknesses: Muñoz is often out of his depth when operating outside the nar-
row scope of his true subject. Emperor Frederick iii was not his predeces-
sor’s brother, but William I’s son (p. 10), and Chancellor Adenauer’s resigna-
tion in 1963 was not due to the revelation that there had been a spy (Heinz 
Felfe) inside the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) 
(p. 199).
When it comes to the units and commanders of Secret Field Police units, 
however, in Greece and elsewhere, this book is an almost unbeatable compen-
dium. Based on meticulous archival work, Muñoz lists who served where, and 
in particular who was involved in war crimes, and in the round-ups of Jews all 
over Europe. Here, the book offers far more than the title would suggest; this 
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is a valuable insight into one of the lesser-known elements of the German an-
nihilation policies during the Second World War.
Winfried Heinemann
German Commission of Military History
Stănescu, Manuel: Odessa. Gustul amar al victoriei (August-Octombrie 1941) 
(Târgovişte, 2017), 206 pp., isbn 9786065373549.
 Odessa: The Bitter Taste of Victory (August-October 1941)
Romania involved itself in the Second World War to recover its national ter-
ritories (Bessarabia and northern Bucovina) annexed by the ussr in June 1940. 
This book, written by the young historian Manuel Stănescu, is founded on a 
rich, various and well-documented basis, and offers a long-awaited analysis 
of the largest operation undertaken by the Romanian Army in the Second 
World War. The author, with rich evidence, places the battle in the national 
and international context, i.e. the early phase of Operation Barbarossa. He also 
gives specific data on Odessa’s history as a port on the Black Sea and its impor-
tance for Soviet defence (the 9th Independent Army supported by the Separate 
Coastal Army and the Black Sea Fleet).
Based on the Romanian military archives, Stănescu offers details concern-
ing the structure and capacity of the Romanian High Command and its 4th 
Army (about 340,000 men with a strong air element, and support of Romanian 
Navy ships). Acting together with elements of the German 11th Army, the Ro-
manian operational plan envisaged offensive developments against the three 
heavily fortified Soviet lines of defence. The book includes a fair critique of the 
decisions taken, the troops’ preparation and the conduct of operations; we find 
also data and appreciations of the fighters’ morale and behaviour.
The result of the battle, after both sides had experienced heavy losses 
(more than 90,000 Romanian dead, wounded and missing, while the Sovi-
ets reported about 60,000) was the evacuation of Odessa (350,000 military 
and civilians) and the establishment of the Transnistria Governorate. The 
Romanian intervention facilitated the successful German offensive into 
the Kiev region and then to Moscow, but the author’s conclusion is very se-
vere: the Romanian military was not yet ready for the realities of the battle-
field of the Second World War (organisation, equipment and training, as 
well as dysfunctional staff work). Despite the bloody victory, it soon had 
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consequences for her international position which shocked Romanian public 
opinion.
Dumitru Preda
 Romanian Commission of Military History, Member of the icmh Bib-
liographic Committee
 Cold War
Shrader, Charles R.: A War of Logistics: Parachutes and Porters in Indochina, 
1945–1954 (Lexington, MA, 2015), xvi + 488 pp., isbn 978-0-8131-6575-2.
U.S. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley reportedly stated that military 
“amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics”, thus highlighting the 
paramount importance of logistics in military operations. The First Indo-
china War, fought in the inhospitable terrain and climate of Southeast Asia, 
with inadequate logistical facilities and vulnerable lines of communica-
tion, provides an outstanding case study of the role of logistics in military 
operations.
The First Indochina War, 1945–1955, was fought by the colonial power of 
France to re-establish its hegemony and civil authority in Southeast Asia in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, against the Communist-inspired and - 
supported Viet Minh, who were determined to destroy the yoke of French 
imperialism and gain independence. This masterful study by retired U.S. Army 
officer and scholar Charles R. Shrader, focuses on the organization and capa-
bilities of the opposing forces “during the period of active conventional war-
fare in Indochina between October 1950 and May 1954” (p. xv).
There were tremendous logistical challenges facing both opponents, includ-
ing terrain, climate, poor transportation infrastructure, and a lack of accurate 
maps. While these tended to favour the more lightly-equipped Viet Minh, who 
used flexible guerrilla tactics throughout most of the war, the French, accord-
ing to the author, “proved relatively inflexible and unable to adapt to the hostile 
physical environment” (p. 5). The one major French advantage was airpower, 
although its effectiveness and use was reduced by poor flying conditions and 
the lack of maps. In the all-important logistical arena, which had an impact on 
the outcome of the conflict, the Viet Minh were better able to take advantage 
of the challenges and opportunities presented by the demanding Indochinese 
physical environment.
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Operationally, the conflict can be divided into two main phases. The first 
phase took place from 1945 to 1950 and was characterized by small-scale guer-
rilla and counter-guerrilla operations that did not put a significant strain on 
the logistical structures or resources of either side. After 1950, the war turned 
into more of a conventional conflict involving larger units engaging in more so-
phisticated operations over larger areas. This increased support requirements 
and required changes to the respective support structures and systems.
The author has further identified three overlapping logistical campaigns 
throughout the war, with each dominating “a particular temporal period to 
which they gave a particular character” (p. 7). The first logistical campaign was 
fought from the end of the Second World War in August 1945, when French mil-
itary forces returned to Indochina, to December 1950. This was a strategic and 
logistical preparatory period, characterized by small-scale guerrilla and coun-
ter-guerrilla operations. Extended conventional military operations, including 
those by division-strength forces and a struggle over base areas, took place dur ing 
the second phase (December 1950 to July 1953). The third logistical campaign, 
in which the Viet Minh sought to seize the initiative in operations that began 
in the fall of 1952, included battles to control the extended lines of communica-
tions and ended with the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.
This intriguing study is organized thematically and chronologically. Based 
on contemporary and post-war French and Vietnamese reports and memoirs, 
as well as declassified contemporary French official documents and U.S. intel-
ligence materials, the level of detail is most impressive. This deeply-researched 
and well-written narrative, supplemented by 13 maps, 31 tables, 13 figures, and 
70 pages of notes, will remain the authoritative study of logistics in the First 
Indochina War – and a cautionary tale to Western military forces that consis-
tently underestimate the logistical capabilities of their adversaries.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
Reichenberger, Florian: Der gedachte Krieg: Vom Wandel der Kriegsbilder in der 
Bundeswehr (Berlin, 2018), 498 pp., isbn 978-3-11-046260-9. 
 The Imagined War. Changing concepts of warfare in the Bundeswehr
How can an army develop its own pattern of war if it is part of a military alli-
ance, and has no room for manoeuvre within the framework of nuclear war-
fare? This is the question addressed by the young German historian Florian 
Reichenberger in his study of the Bundeswehr’s pattern of war during the 
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Cold War. During the forty years of Cold War, Germany was always seen as 
a front-line state and therefore as the stage for an eventual Third World War. 
The Bundeswehr leadership always had to envisage a scenario that would ef-
fectively devastate the Federal Republic that it was originally meant to defend.
For the first time, here is an analysis of the concepts of war that the found-
ing fathers of the Bundeswehr brought to their task, based on their experi-
ence in the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, and which they had to adapt to 
the new military and geostrategic conditions after 1945. Even after having lost 
the war, German generals enjoyed a good reputation in conventional warfare. 
Still, all nato planning assumed nuclear warfare against the Warsaw Pact. This 
would likely have precluded an active role for the Bundeswehr leadership. In 
case of war, its job would have been one of damage limitation, and even that 
looked pretty hopeless in view of the potential widespread devastation. Even 
so, high-ranking German officers could influence nato military planning if 
they assumed command within the nato structure, such as General Hans 
Speidel, who became Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe in 1957.
Major General Wolf Graf Baudissin did not shrink from pointing out unwel-
come truths. On the international stage, in 1962 he painted in grim colours the 
disastrous scope of a nuclear war, hoping to warn nato partners against the 
use of atomic munitions. Even if its room for manoeuvre during the Cold War 
was that small, in nato planning and exercises the Bundeswehr could dem-
onstrate impressively how non-nuclear combined-arms warfare might work.
Gabriele Bosch
German Commission for Military History
Institute for Military History, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea: 
The History of the ROK-US Alliance, 1953–2013 (Seoul, 2014), 485 pp.
The Mutual Defence Treaty (mdt) between the United States and the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) was forged in the crucible of combat of the 1950–1953 Korean 
War. It was signed on 1 October 1953, and it laid the cornerstone for the highly-
successful and enduring ROK-U.S. Alliance. The year 2013 marked the 60th an-
niversary of the mdt, and this highly-detailed and superbly-written narrative 
and analysis of the predominantly-military ROK-U.S. Alliance was written to 
chronicle and commemorate this seminal event in Northeast Asian history.
This study was written to “highlight the positive aspects of the [ROK-U.S.] Al-
liance and to mitigate elements of conflict in ROK-US relations, thereby further 
strengthening cooperation and exchange and promoting new developments in 
ROK-US relations” (p. 472). While the ROK-U.S. Alliance is  multifaceted and 
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highly-complex, its basis is mutual defence: that if either party is attacked by 
a third country, the other party will act to meet the common danger. In reality, 
the U.S. has stationed troops (numbering about 28,500 in 2013) continuously in 
South Korea since the end of the Korean War to supplement the South  Korean 
armed forces. Throughout this period, the Alliance has evolved to include 
 other factors, such as the key role of the Alliance in U.S strategy in Northeast 
Asia, South Korea’s transformation into one of the world’s leading economies, 
and the nation’s continued democratization.
This study focuses on the overarching military component of the ROK-U.S. 
 Alliance, and is divided into six generally chronological chapters. Chapter 1 
(pp. 12–19) provides an overview of the organization and contents of the book. 
The second chapter, “The Establishment of the ROK-US Alliance” (p. 20–89) is 
one of the most important of the study, providing background and contextual 
information on the origin of ROK-U.S. relations, U.S. participation in the Ko-
rean War, the ROK-U.S. mdt, the partial withdrawal of U.S. military forces and 
the reinforcement of the ROK armed forces, and post-Korean War “restoration” 
and reconstruction.
“The Growth of the ROK-US Alliance” is the subject of Chapter 3 (pp. 90–
155), which highlights the changing international and national situation dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s. While the predominant role of the United States in the 
Vietnam War is widely-recognized, it is not as well-known that the South Kore-
ans provided the second largest number of troops, peaking at 49,869 in 1968, in 
that conflict, an act that reinforced U.S. and ROK solidarity. The U.S. withdrew 
some troops from South Korea to augment its forces in Vietnam, while initia-
tives were undertaken to make the ROK armed forces more self-reliant. Other 
topics in this chapter include the conclusion of the Status of Forces Agreement 
(sofa) and the development of professional military education and doctrine 
in the ROK armed forces.
Chapter 4, “The Enhancement of the ROK-US Alliance” (pp. 156–259) exam-
ines the post-Vietnam era evolution of the Alliance, including the reduction of 
U.S. Forces Korea in the mid-1970s and the complementary establishment of 
the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 1978. Other topics include com-
bined exercises and developments in the wartime logistics system, post-Cold 
War changes to U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea’s nuclear program, defence ex-
penditures, and ROK economic development.
The transition of operational control of the ROK armed forces remained 
controversial throughout this period. This issue, within the context of the 
changing international and Alliance political systems, is underscored in 
Chapter 5, “The Development of the ROK-US Alliance” (pp. 260–381). While 
peacetime operational control of the ROK armed forces was transferred to the 
ROK in 1994, wartime operational control remains in a process of transition. 
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The post-Cold War period witnessed further changes, including a strategic 
realignment and planned relocation of U.S. Forces Korea. Further develop-
ment of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and bipartite security dialogue, within the con-
text of a 21st century global security environment, is examined.
The sixth chapter, “Conclusion” (pp. 382–393) provides a summary of the 
volume and of the evolution of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and points a way ahead 
for the future. The Alliance has maintained the Korean War Armistice for over 
six decades and deterred war on the Korean Peninsula, and has evolved from 
a security alliance into a comprehensive strategic alliance. It will, according to 
the authors, “have to be developed into an alliance that goes beyond the [Ko-
rean] Peninsula and contributes to the world peace and prosperity” (p. 392).
The History of the ROK-US Alliance, 1953–2013, is a superbly-researched, 
well-written, and comprehensive chronicle and assessment of the Alliance. It 
is profusely illustrated and contains scores of detailed, supplementary tables 
and figures. Moreover, it contains 16 comprehensive and insightful appen-
dices, covering a number of chronologies, organizational charts, combined 
training exercise listings, meeting minutes, and other key documents. While 
written from a Korean-centric perspective, it is surprisingly objective and 
balanced for an official South Korean military history, incorporating sources 
from many countries. This book is clearly the definitive narrative of the en-
during ROK-U.S. Alliance that has maintained stability in Northeast Asia for 
well over half a century and will continue to strongly deter aggression in the 
region.
Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
British Commission for Military History
Israel Defense Forces (idf) Operations Directorate/Doctrine & Training Divi-
sion/History: 
Firestorm in the Desert, 382 pp. 
Conquer the Mountain, 400 pp. 
Eliminate the Threat, 320 pp. 
Sea Breakers, 156 pp. 
(Modan, 2017)
In the years following the Six-Day War, through a painstaking effort of collect-
ing, researching, writing and editing, the idf History Department (which until 
that war had been a small branch within mahad – the idf Training Depart-
ment) published five volumes containing detailed descriptions and analyses of 
the background to the war, the moves of the Israeli forces vis-à-vis the moves of 
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the enemy forces and the results of the war. The Israeli Air Force and Navy also 
prepared their conclusions.
At the time, it was a gigantic effort led and overseen by the Head of the His-
tory Department at the time, Colonel Avraham Eylon (“Lench”), who sensed 
the need to document that war in a comprehensive and detailed manner, in 
line with the example of “The Official History” of His Majesty’s Armed Forces, 
written by historian Cyril Falls, which had covered the Great War (eventually 
known as the First World War).
Five “green” volumes were published as an internal idf edition (cover-
ing the international arena and the United Nations, the enemy and the three 
fronts) and disseminated to idf commanders for further review, after they had 
been debriefed regarding their respective contributions. For various reasons, 
the first, extended edition was never distributed to the civil realm, as it was 
never distributed within the idf.
Now, on the 50th anniversary of the Six-Day War, the idf and its History De-
partment decided to publish – for the general public – a comprehensive and 
revised edition of those volumes. The idea was to have the books published, 
almost as they were, assuming that the past research effort was  comprehensive 
and thorough and had been carried out by a sizable team over a number of years. 
That team had based its work largely on documents: operations logs,  orders, 
maps and even the communication networks used during the war. The extend-
ed team had reviewed the summations of the individual units and the debrief-
ing documents recorded by the various echelons, visited the battlegrounds, and 
interviewed and debriefed commanders and fighters in the combat zones. The 
findings of this team, which had been written and edited, were presented to the 
relevant commanders and in most cases received their approval.
The 2017 edition, edited by Lt. Col. (res.) Boaz Zalmanovich, has been issued 
in three regional volumes in which the enemy and international background 
aspects, previously dealt with in separate volumes, were incorporated as well. 
The books are chronicles of the fighting, presenting the basic data regarding 
the enemy, Israeli forces, the operational plans and the actual moves. Gener-
ally, they provide detailed descriptions down to battalion and company level, 
with the exception of some notable battles (Tel Facher, Kalaa, Ammunition 
Hill, the operations by the Naval Commandos in the Egyptian seaports of Alex-
andria and Port-Said and other battles).
The new edition was revised and language-edited to adapt it to current He-
brew. Additional information, details and references to new books and studies, 
published on the subject over the years since the War were included as well, as 
were the editor’s footnotes. New maps, prepared on the basis of the old ones, 
were also included in the new edition, along with explanations for various 
terms, like the enemy formations “Majmu’ah” and “Foj”.
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In his foreword to the new edition, idf Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizen-
kot, wrote that “Even at this time we still learn and draw lessons from the 
Six-Day War – from the preparedness that was typical of the military forces at 
the outbreak of the war, which led to the victory, through the manner in which 
decisions were made from the top echelons down to the field echelons and 
from the effective courses of action employed in all of the sectors”.
The new books were given titles that are relevant to the different sectors:
Firestorm in the Desert: This volume describes the operations in the south-
ern sector, opposite the Egyptians in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. This volume 
was revised pursuant to the book “Red Sheet” by Maj. Gen. Yeshaiahu Gavish, 
who was the General Commanding idf Southern Command during that war. 
His book and most of the details it contains had been based on the research 
effort of the idf History Department.
Conquer the Mountain: This volume describes the operations opposite the 
Jordanians in the West Bank. It includes the remarks of Maj. Gen. Uzi Nar-
kis, who was the General Commanding the idf Central Command during that 
war. Narkis claimed that he had not reviewed the original version.
Eliminate the Threat: This volume describes the operations opposite the Syr-
ians and the capturing of the Golan Heights. This volume was revised primarily 
according to the findings concluded in Mati Meisel’s book The Battle over the 
Golan.
Sea Breakers: This volume describes the naval operations with an additional 
review and explanation of terms by Brig. Gen. (res.) Nir Maor.
The revised four-volume edition was augmented by Shimon Golan’s previous-
ly published book War on Three Fronts, which deals with the decision-making of 
the Israeli supreme command. Apparently, this volume has not been updated.
The story of the Israeli Air Force in the Six-Day War was not included in the 
revised edition.
Dani Asher
Israeli Commission for Military History
Strachan, Alexander: 1 Recce: The Night Belongs to Us (Cape Town, 2018), 351 
pp., isbn 9780624081531.
The South African Border War of 1966–1989 (also known as the South African 
Bush War, the Namibian War of Independence or the War for Southern 
Africa) formed part of the Great Southern African Liberation War of 1961 
(when guerrilla activities commenced in Angola) to 2002 (when Jonas  Savimbi 
was killed, thus ending the protracted civil war in Angola). Although the 
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so-called Border War ended some thirty years ago, the stream of books on this 
conflict shows no sign of abating. One of the latest – and best – books on the 
war written from a South African point of view is Alexander Strachan’s 1 Recce: 
The Night Belongs to Us (simultaneously published in Afrikaans as 1 Recce: Die 
Nag Behoort aan Ons).
Strachan is the renowned author of several award-winning Afrikaans 
novels – including work that established the so-called “Border literature” as 
a genre in Afrikaans (and South African) literature. 1 Recce is Strachan’s first 
non-fiction book and is based on his experiences as a “recce”; i.e. a member of 
the (pre-1994) South African Defence Force (sadf; since 1994 known as South 
African National Defence Force, sandf), Reconnaissance Commandos (also 
known as Special Forces Reconnaissance Regiments).
After decades of secrecy, Strachan reveals the origins and development of 1 
Reconnaissance Commando and the role it played during the so-called Border 
War. He takes the reader along with him behind the scenes, and “behind enemy 
lines” during (from a South African point of view) the war “up north” (in South 
West Africa/ Namibia and Angola) and “on the border” (between Namibia and 
Angola, and beyond). He provides insights into the rigorous training (no more 
than ten percent of recruits ever successfully completed recce training), opera-
tions in the years 1974 to 1977, co-operation with Portuguese forces (before they 
withdrew from Angola in 1975) and also with Rhodesian forces (i.e. before that 
country became independent as Zimbabwe in 1980). What is quite incredible, 
is that there were at any given time never more than 67 operators in 1 Recce.
1 Recce is not a conventional military history publication. After all, it con-
tains a strong autobiographical element. But the author has an exciting story 
to tell, and he does it with insight and flair. Strachan, the excellent story-teller 
(and novelist) is always present and he sweeps his readers along with him. 
He did a lot of research in an effort to place his own experiences in perspec-
tive and to provide additional background information. See in this regard the 
many interviews that he conducted as well as other sources that he consulted 
(source list pp. 349–350). Unfortunately, there is no index. The 63 photographs 
that are included (most of them in colour, and mostly never published before) 
add value to a highly readable and informative book on a controversial unit 
that took part in a controversial conflict.
1 Recce: The Night Belongs to Us has to be read together with other impor-
tant books that deal with the so-called Border War, including those of Daniel 
Steyn and Arné Söderlund, Iron Fist from the Sea: South Africa’s Seaborne Raid-
ers 1978–1988 (Rugby, 2014), Ian Liebenberg, Jorge Risquet and Vladimir Shubin 
(eds.), A Far-away War: Angola, 1975–1989 (Stellenbosch, 2015), Koos Stadler, 
Recce: Small Team Missions Behind Enemy Lines (Oxford and Philadelphia, 
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2015) – and many, many more. Strachan’s book makes a very important contri-
bution towards the historiography of the Border War, and deserves to be read 
by a wide audience.
André Wessels
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein
 After 1990
Meijer, Hugo, and Marco Wyss (eds.): The Handbook of European Defence Poli-
cies and Armed Forces (Oxford, 2018), xxxvi + 960 pp., isbn 978-0-19-879050-1.
This handbook does not only provide an up-to date summary of the current 
state of defence policies and armed forces in Europe. It aims higher and offers 
a strong and convincing thesis by stating that in recent years the academic 
literature has paid too much attention to the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (csdp) while neglecting the differences between European states. Be-
cause the national level is still central for decisions in security and military 
affairs, the handbook’s claim is to “refocus the attention, and give analytical 
precedence to, national defence policy and armed forces in Europe” (p. 3). In 
the face of resurging national tendencies in Europe and in other regions, as 
well as in security and defence policies and in other policy fields, this thesis 
could not come more timely.
In its first and central part, the handbook provides a comprehensive, Europe- 
wide comparison of national defence policies – including non-nato and non-
EU countries like Belarus, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey, which are all too 
often ignored in such overviews. The countries are grouped into three catego-
ries based on their nominal defence spending (fn. 17, p. 4): major, medium, and 
lesser powers. This rather static criterion leads among other things to the effect 
that Turkey is labelled as a medium power. A more flexible approach could 
have taken strategic relevance, political ambitions, and military capabilities 
into account and thereby led to a more convincing categorization. The country 
chapters confirm the editors’ thesis of substantial differences in defence poli-
cies across Europe.
The chapters would have gained added value by relying on a common struc-
ture. Instead, each author chooses his or her own outline which might be ap-
propriate for a specific state but hinders the comparison across countries.
With a third of roughly 1,000 text pages, and 20 out of 51 chapters, the 
country overview provides the bulk of the text. The other chapters deal with 
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alliances and partnerships (Part II), security challenges (Part iii), strategic 
and doctrinal responses (Part IV), military capabilities (Part V), and national 
military operations (Part VI). The passage through these articles shed light on 
national as well as regional patterns of defence policies and military cultures – 
without always drawing a clear-cut picture. Some policies show trends towards 
adaption and stronger cooperation (e.g., anti-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons), whereas we see mixed results for other areas (e.g., counterterrorism), or 
even the stubborn persistence of national preferences and approaches (e.g., 
counterinsurgency).
Key audiences for this handbook are scholars and students of political sci-
ence. For historians, the book offers a reliable access to current developments, 
discussions, literature, and research. Some of its contributions rely on a chron-
ological approach, mostly beginning with the end of the Cold War. The hand-
book is a valuable, up-to-date overview on defence policies and armed forces 
in Europe. With its focus on the national approach it fills a gap in the academic 
literature. Future events will show whether the depicted tendencies of (re-) 
nationalization are a lasting trend or just a bump on the way towards more 
cooperation and deeper integration in security and military affairs.
Heiko Biehl
Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences
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